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CONFESSIONS BY THE ACCUSED-DOES
MIRANDA RELATE TO REALITY?
Introduction
Joey is a killer-a Mafia hit man. By self admission he is a
murderer of thirty-eight men: thirty-five for money, three for revenge.
Joey is neither the anti-hero of a modem movie nor the protaganist
of a novel. He is real. He is the subject of a book1 and has appeared
as a guest on television talk shows.2 On at least one occasion,
although his identity was concealed from the audience and specific
statements that would constitute viable evidence in a criminal trial
were avoided, Joey made the equivalent of a confession on television.3
At the time, he stated that his revelations were made in the public
interest; that if the public were aware of the inadequacy of laws
relating to vice (e.g., prostitution, gambling, drugs), it would pressure
legislators to repeal such laws and eliminate the need for "hit-men"
such as himself. In his own words, he emphasized that his occupation
exists only because "people want certain things and that makes me
a job. Without the public, there ain't no me."4 Two questions came
to mind as I watched the show: (1) why is this man freely walking
the streets and (2) what would motivate a professional killer to
publicly confess?
The purpose of this note is to consider the ramifications of these
questions raised by Joey and others like him. However, because this
paper is not a note in the classical sense, some words of explanation
are appropriate. Though the questions raised by Joey present several
possible areas of analysis, the scope of this note is restricted to
confessions, focusing on Miranda v. Arizona5 as the major United
States Supreme Court statement in the area. Further, although
certain conclusions and proposals are presented herein, the thrust
of this note is intended to be provocative rather than explanatory or
expositive of a particular viewpoint. It endeavors, as such, to expose
to the reader a new, and to some extent unique, perspective from
which to analyze criminal procedure relating to confessions. In
developing this discussion the following format will be followed:
1 D. Fisymn, JoEmY: AuToarooPAz-nr oF A MAri HrrmAN (1973).2 Joey appeared on the David Susskind Show on June 17, 1973 [hereinafter
cited as the Susskind Show].
3These conclusions are based on the observations of the author from viewing
Joey on the David Susskind Show, June 17, 1973.4 The Susskind Show.
5 884 U.S. 436 (1966).
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(1) the relevant portions of criminal procedure; (2) an examination
of the policy behind the present law of criminal procedure with
respect to confessions; (3) a discussion of how other disciplines
(i.e., psychology and literature) relate to the law of confessions; (4) a
proposal to alleviate certain conflicts in the law.
I. THE MECEANIcs OF ADMissmm r OF CONFESSIONS
The primary thrust of the Supreme Court's decisions in Jackson v.
DennoG and Lego v. Twomey 7 has been to ensure that any confession
used in a court of law be made voluntarily. This voluntariness, as a
constitutional mandate, must be determined prior to trial by the judge
using a "preponderance of the evidence"8 rather than a "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard.9 Thereafter, it is not imperative that
the jury also be given an opportunity to determine the voluntariness
of the purported confession.10
In Jackson," a case in which a murder conviction was based in
large part on a confession, the defendant, after committing an armed
robbery of a hotel clerk, fled from the scene. In the course of his
flight Jackson encountered a policeman, and an exchange of gunfire
left Jackson wounded and the policeman dead. Jackson was eventually
traced by the police to a hospital where he had gone for treatment.
When questioned at the hospital by a police detective investigating
the case, Jackson told the detective, "I shot the colored cop. I got
the drop on him."12 At the trial, the detective testified that when
Jackson confessed at the hospital he was in good physical condition.
Several hours after this initial questioning, during a subsequent inter-
rogation, Jackson was given as medication 50 milligrams of Demerol
and 1/50 grain of scopolamine, and shortly thereafter admitted
having committed the robbery. At one point Jackson purportedly
said, "Look, I can't go on,"13 but after more questioning, he admitted
having shot the policeman.
At trial, in attempting to exclude the confession, 14 Jackson con-
tended that he was denied water and was gasping for breath.
0 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
7404 U.s. 477 (1972).8378 U.S. 368 (1964).
9 404 U.s. 477 (1972).10 Id.
11378 U.S. 368 (1964).
12 Id. at 371.
13 Id.
14 At the time this case was tried,-New York-criminal procedure dictated that
a confession had to be introduced into testimony when there was an issue
regarding voluntariness. The jury then was instructed to determine whether the
confession was given voluntarily and to accept or reject the confession ac-
cordingly. Id. at 377.
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Witnesses present during the interrogation admitted that this was
true but stated that the water was withheld only for medical reasons
prior to the injection of the medication.
At the time this case was tried, New York criminal procedure
dictated that a confession had to be introduced into testimony. The
jury then was instructed to determine whether or not the confession
was given voluntarily and to accept or reject the confession accord-
ingly.15 In holding this procedure unconstitutional, Mr. Justice White,
speaking for the Court, stated that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires that a defendant be afforded a de-
termination of the reliability of his confession notwithstanding its
truth or falsity. Such a determination was unavailable under the
New York procedure because, where the jury returns only a general
verdict as to guilt or innocence, "[i]t is impossible to discover whether
the jury found the confession voluntary and relied upon it, or involun-
tary and supposedly ignored it."18
In comparison to New York procedure, it was noted that in
Massachusetts when an issue of voluntariness arises, the jury does
not hear a confession until the trial judge determines that the con-
fession was made voluntarily. Although the jury may disagree with
the judge and exclude the confession from its deliberation, the
Court stated that the preliminary determination by the judge alone
did not violate the defendant's rights as did the New York pro-
cedure.17
The rationale behind Jackson seems sound if the policy of the
law is that a defendant's constitutional rights are paramount when
balanced against society's interest in obtaining convictions regardless
of police methods. The reason for this policy was explained when
the Court stated that involuntary confessions are rejected:
because of the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey
the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty
can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict
those thought to be criminal as from the actual criminals them-
selves.' 8
Accepting this policy, the Court logically had no choice but to
decide as it did, since it is simply unreasonable to assume that a
jury confronted with a true, though perhaps coerced, confession would
acquit the defendant.
'5 Id. at 874-75.16 Id. at 379.
rId. at 378 n.8.
Is Id. at 386, citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 820-21 (1959).
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Unresolved by Jackson was the question of whether after a
determination of voluntariness by the trial judge, the jury was also
entitled to decide the same question. Lego v. Twomey1" answered
this inquiry in the negative and established a test whereby the
question of voluntariness is to be determined by a preponderance
of the evidence as opposed to a test of beyond a reasonable doubt.
Lego, whose conviction for robbery was based primarily on a con-
fession, claimed that his confession was the result of police brutality.
Photographs taken of Lego shortly after his arrest showed him to
have a swollen face and traces of blood. The police officers who
testified at the trial contended that the injuries ensued from Lego's
scuffle with his victim and denied the charges of brutality. The trial
judge, agreeing with the police, ruled that the confession was volun-
tary and refused to instruct the jury on the question of voluntariness.
Under Illinois law at the time of Lego's trial20 all that was required
was that the judge base his decision on a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Lego argued, in accord with In Re Winship,21 that the proper
test is that the confessions must be voluntary beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Supreme Court, concluding that the test for admissibility
need not be the same as the standard used by the jury in determining
guilt or innocence, held Winship inapplicable to Lego and similar
situations. It reasoned that the function of exclusionary rules was
to prevent police abuses and that the lighter burden of proof would
not affect that behavior. Although the states are free to adopt a
higher standard, the Court held that in a pre-trial hearing "the
prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence
that the confession was voluntary."22 Additionally, the Court held
that once a judicial determination of voluntariness has been made,
the question need not be decided again by the jury. The states are
divided in their application of Lego,23 but the better reasoned cases
have required not only that the judge use a reasonable doubt
standard in deciding the question of voluntariness, but also that,
after such a determination, the jury be allowed to resolve the issue
for itself.
In comparing Jackson and Lego, it is at once apparent that
Jackson is the better reasoned decision, because it recognizes that the
admissibility of a confession is primarily, or at least initially, a question
of law. Traditionally, our system of jurisprudence has recognized
19 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
20 People v. Wagoner, 133 N.E.2d 24 (MII. 1956).
21397 U.S. 358 (1970).
22404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972).23 See Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 1251 (Supp. 1973).
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the need for excluding inadmissible evidence from the jury's delibera-
tions, although our procedures have not always achieved this result.
Nonetheless, it follows logically that if society makes a policy choice
to exclude involuntary confessions, it is incongruous to allow the
jurors to hear a confession and then to instruct them to disregard it.
If there is to be any reality behind exclusionary rules of evidence,
involuntary confessions must be totally excluded from the jury.
Jackson, by treating voluntariness as a question of law, provides this
protection.
Lego, however, not only weakens Jackson, but also may create
a situation less beneficial to the defendant than the New York
procedure struck down in Jackson by allowing confessions to be ad-
mitted by a preponderance of the evidence and then precluding the
jury from determining the voluntariness of the confession.24 This
means that, in effect, a defendant may be convicted on the basis of a
preponderance of the evidence because if the confession is the key
element of the state's case and if it is admitted by a preponderance
of the evidence, then the general conclusionary instruction of "beyond
a reasonable doubt" for conviction may be functionally inoperative.
This reasoning is based on the assumption that a confession not
seriously challenged virtually assures conviction. With such potential
results, it is commendable. that states such as New York25 have
adopted standards higher than the minimum required by Lego.
II. Poucx BEHIND THm PrxsENT LAw oF CoN__sioNs
Modem confession law is a product of the rise of the incorporation
doctrine. It was not until 1964, in Malloy v. Hogan,26 that the Supreme
Court incorporated or applied the fifth amendment to the states via
the fourteenth amendment. However, in the federal system, con-
trolled by the fifth amendment, voluntariness has been the criterion
since 189727 and it has been long established that any type of com-
pulsion invalidates a confession.28
The state courts, where most criminal cases were tried, meanwhile
were limited in their procedure relating to confessions only by Supreme
Court decisions decided on the basis of due process. In the early
Supreme Court cases overturning state procedures, one can denote a
different focus from that of modem law. Whereas recent opinions
focus largely on controlling police behavior to ensure an effective
24404 U.S. 477 (1972).25 E.g., People v. Huntley, 204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965).
26378 U.S. 1 (1964).27 Bran v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).2 8 Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
[Vol 62
CONFESSIONS
opportunity for defendants to assert their constitutional rights, the
earlier cases seemed to concentrate on discerning what types of
circumstances would warrant a conclusion that a purported con-
fession was unreliable. This earlier position is in part explained by
the fact that many of the early cases involved black criminals or
suspects, subject to "white man's law." One cannot help but speculate
that a desire to give the black man his rights was as significant as a
desire to protect criminal defendants in cases such as Brown v. Mis-
sissippf,29 Chambers v. Florida,° and Ward v. Texas.31
In Brown, 2 a black man was arrested for the murder of a white
man and after a perfunctory trial on the day following the arrest,
a sentence of death was imposed. The Supreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Holmes, concluded that without the defendant's
confession, there would have been insufficient evidence to submit the
question to the jury. After his arrest Brown was apparently beaten
and banged, as evidenced by marks on his neck at the trial, and
allegedly he had been threatened "with more of the same" if he
retracted the confession thus elicited. The Supreme Court concluded
that such a brutally induced confession violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In the Chambers33 case a black man was accused of the murder
of an elderly white man. The crime occurred one evening about nine
o'clock and so enraged the white citizenry that within an hour 25 to 40
black men had been arrested without warrants and taken to jail some
distance from their homes, presumably to protect them from mob
violence. The suspects were questioned for five days and subjected to
considerable physical abuse before Chambers confessed to the murder.
The Supreme Court concluded that the Constitution protects those
who "might suffer because they are non-conforming victims of prejudice
and public excitement," 4 and that due process required reversal in
such circumstances.
In Ward,35 once again, a black man was accused of the murder
of a white man and once again the Supreme Court noted that, but
for the confession, the conviction was a legal impossibility. Ward,
arrested without a warrant and taken to a jail over a hundred miles
from his home, claimed that he was whipped, beaten and burned. The
29 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
303 09 U.S. 227 (1940).
31316 U.S. 547 (1942).32 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
33 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
34 Id. at 242.
s5 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
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Court held that the "petitioner was no longer able freely to admit or
to deny or refuse to answer, and that he was willing to make any
statement that the officers wanted him to make."36
Several factors are clear from reading these cases. First, if the
factual allegations were true, any sense of due process and justice was
clearly violated. Second, confessions obtained under the fact situations
in Brown, Ward, and Chambers are highly suspect as to their truthful-
ness. Third, one might suspect that the Supreme Court was repre-
manding southern discrimination as well as protecting criminal rights.
With the criminal rights revolution in the 1960's the problem of
confessions moved from severe abuses to more refined technical
points of law. It is not necessarily true that decisions based on mere
technicalities are wrong; however, one must recognize that there
has been an important shift in this area of the law. For example, in
Brown, especially in light of the history of that period, it would not
be unreasonable to believe that the confessions were unreliable due
to the excessive physical abuses. In later decisions, however, it is
quite possible that the confessions invalidated by the Court were
actually true. The first shift in emphasis was manifested in 1964 in
Escobedo v. Illinois.3 7
A. Escobedo v. Illinois
Escobedo arose in conjunction with the right to counsel, as
enunciated in Gideon v. Wainwright.3 s Escobedo, charged with the
murder of his brother-in-law, was arrested the night of the murder
and released. Ten days later one Benedict DiGerlando told the police
that Escobedo had shot the victim. Escobedo then was arrested for
a second time and taken to the police station. On the way, he was told
he had "better admit it".39 The defendant asked for his lawyer and
was told his lawyer did not wish to see him; in reality Escobedo's
lawyer was trying to see him but was denied access by the police.
Escobedo claimed that during the interrogation a police officer,
Montesano, who like Escobedo was a Spanish-American, told him in
Spanish that he "could go home if [Escobedo] pinned it on Benedict
DiGerlando."40 DiGerlando was then brought into the room and,
according to the police, Escobedo said to DiGerlando, "I didn't shoot
361d. at 555.
37378 U.S. 478 (1964).38 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
39 378 U.S. at 479.401d. at 482.
[Vol 62.
CONFESSIONS
Manuel, you did it."41 Thereafter, Escobedo made further statements
of an incriminating nature.
The Supreme Court, in overturning the conviction, stated that the
defendant "was undoubtedly unaware that under Illinois law an ad-
mission of mere complicity in the murder plot was legally as damaging
as an admission of firing the fatal shots .... The guiding hand of
counsel was essential to advise petitioner of his rights in this delicate
situation."w
It is important to note the change in the attitude of the Court
during the 30 year period between Brown43 and Escobedo.44 As
previously noted, the emphasis in Brown was on the veracity of the
confession, whereas in Escobedo the Court dealt with procedural
protections without regard to the truthfulness of the confession. This
distinction can perhaps best be seen by analyzing two motion pictures
depicting crime in the two respective periods and public reaction to
those films.
The public has accepted numerous films illustrative of the Brown
period depicting Southern injustice to blacks. One such film, To Kill
a Mockingbird,45 concerns a black man wrongfully accused of raping
a white girl. The black man is defended by a courageous attorney
who unsuccessfully tries to secure the black man's freedom. Conversely,
Hollywood recently has incorporated the Escobedo-Miranda safe-
guards into its movies in such a manner as to provoke public indigna-
tion. Perhaps the best known film of this nature is Dirty Harry,46 in
which a particularly offensive killer is captured by the hero-policeman,
Harry, who elicits information utilizing tactics reminiscent of the
Brown era. This obviously psychopathic criminal is released by the
district attorney on procedural grounds. When Harry once again
meets the criminal, instead of arresting him, he kills him to the
delight of the moviegoers. Although Dirty Harry was not a cinematic
masterpiece, it reflects an important factor often ignored by the
Supreme Court-the public mood. Certainly the Court should not
base its decisions on public opinion, but it must, in its search for
remedies, avoid unnecessary antagonism of the public. For if the
public becomes too cynical about the Supreme Court, the public may
41 Id. at 483.
42 Id.
43 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
44 378 U.S. 478 (1964).45 Based on H. LE, To KIIL A MOCKNGBIBmD (1960).4 0 Dirty Harry, directed by Harry Guardino, was released in March, 1972, by
Warner Bros. 1973 INTEBNATIONAL MOTION PIcmunE ALMANAC 294.
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grow irretrievably distrustful, disrespectful and disdainful of the law's
ability to effect justice. After all, the public is concerned with results
rather than legal theory.
B. Miranda v. Arizona
The next major development in criminal procedure following
Escobedo was the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona,47 the
definitive case in the area of confessions. In large measure, what has
followed Miranda has been mere gloss, modification and application
of that decision. Consequently it deserves considerable discussion,
first from a legal standpoint and second as a major policy pro-
nouncement.
The Miranda decision, based on the fifth amendment, is actually
four cases consolidated into one due to the similarity of fact patterns.
It is significant that the facts of the four cases are discussed briefly
at the end of the opinion almost by way of footnote, which further
suggests that the Court chose Miranda merely as a vehicle to announce
a major policy refinement.
In Miranda the defendant was arrested at home, taken to a police
station in Phoenix and interrogated in a secluded room without being
told he had the right to an attorney. He did, however, sign a state-
ment claiming he made the confession "'with full knowledge of my
legal rights."' 48 The Supreme Court reversed Miranda's conviction.
The second case considered with Miranda was Vignera v. New
York,49 a case in which the defendant was questioned without being
advised of his right to counsel. In addition, the New York trial court
judge instructed the jury that "[t]he law doesn't say that a confession
is void or invalidated because the police officer didn't advise the
defendant as to his rights."50
The third case, Westoner v. United States,51 involved a witness
who was interrogated by both the FBI and the Kansas City police
for fourteen hours prior to signing a confession. Although the FBI
did warn Westoner of his rights after the Kansas City police had
questioned him, the Court concluded that "an intelligent waiver of
constitutional rights cannot be assumed."52
The last case decided along with Miranda was California v.
Stewart.53 In Stewart, the record was silent as to whether Stewart
47384 U.S. 436 (1966).
48Id. at 492.
491d. at 493.50 Id.
51 Id. at 494.
52 Id. at 496.
53Id. at 497.
[Vol. 62
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was advised of his rights. The Supreme Court stated that a knowing
and intelligent waiver cannot be predicated on a silent record.
The import of Miranda is now common knowledge and familiar
to any layman who watches the numerous police detective stories on
television. The prosecution is precluded from using any statements
arising out of a custodial interrogation (i.e., where a person is in police
custody or is otherwise deprived of his freedom) without demon-
strating that procedural safeguards were taken to protect an accused's
right against self-incrimination. The Court enunciated certain mea-
sures to be taken to ensure that the accused is cognizant of his con-
stitutional rights. These measures were stated as follows:
[pirior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may
be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The de-
fendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver
is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning.5 4
Furthermore, the Court held that the mere fact that an accused may
have volunteered information to the police does not preclude him
from refusing to answer any further questions until he has secured
legal advice.
What followed Miranda was largely an attempt to determine the
parameters and scope of the decision which stands as the last major
step in the Court's redirection of emphasis from the determination of
a confession's truthfulness to a determination of whether or not a
defendant was apprised of his constitutional rights. This change in
policy had been manifested in early cases. For example, in 1961, in
Rogers v. Richmond,55 the Court stated the issue to be "whether the
behavior of the state's law enforcement officials was such as to over-
bear the petitioner's will to resist and bring about a confession ... [,
a question to be answered with complete disregard of whether or not
petitioner in fact spoke the truth."5 6
Because of the multitude of situations that can arise under Miranda,
the case law determining its scope is vast, ranging from tax57 prosecu-
tions to traffic cases;58 however, limits have been found. In Harris v.
541d. at 444-45.
15 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
56 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961).57 E.g., Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).58 E.g., City of Piqua v. Hinger, 234 N.E.2d 821 (Ohio 1967).-
KENTucKY LAw JoTNAL[
New York, for example,59 the Supreme Court held that a confession
inadmissible under Miranda could still be used for purposes of im-
peachment. The sheer number of decisions modifying, limiting, in-
terpreting and explaining Miranda, however, forbids further detail
in this note. Moreover, Miranda alone still represents the major policy
pronouncement in this area of criminal procedure.
A discussion of the policy behind Miranda is perhaps now in
order. The Supreme Court was very direct in setting the tone of the
case; Chief Justice Warren opened by stating that "the cases before
us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American
criminal jurisprudence. ' 60 He then put the issue in terms of balancing
individual rights of constitutional protection against police abuse.
Noting America's long standing aversion to forced confessions, the
Court stated:
"[tihe maxim memo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a
protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of
interrogating accused persons, which [have] long obtained in the
continental system, and until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the
British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for
the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power,
[were] not uncommon even in England. While the admissions or
confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made,
have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence,
if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection
with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions
put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation
to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or
reluctant, to push him into a comer, and to entrap him into fatal
contradictions . . . made the system so odious as to give rise to
demand for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal
procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute
and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence
of the courts in a popular demand. But, however adopted, it has
become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American juris-
prudence. So deeply did the inequities of the ancient system im-
press themselves upon the minds of the American colonies that the
States . . . made a denial of the right to question an accused
person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which
in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this
country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment."6'
The Court then declared that it had a long standing obligation to
enforce those rights,62 which were traceable to abuses in the British
system. Miranda, however, is not merely an attempt to judicially
59 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
60 384 U.S. at 439.
61 Id. at 442-43, citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896).
62 Id. at 443-44, citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
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ensure those rights in one particular case-it is, rather, a mandate for
the police to affirmatively act to make individuals aware of those rights
in every case.
In justifying the rather stringent test and series of warnings
required by Miranda, the Court cited the Wickersham Report 63 and
the findings of the Commission on Civil Fights64 as evidence of police
"strong arm" tactics in eliciting confessions. The Court illustrated its
point by citing People v. Portelli,65 a New York case in which the
defendant was brutally beaten and burned. The Court conceded,
perhaps subverting intellectual honesty to political expediency, that
police abuses were undoubtedly exceptions but concluded that "unless
proper limitations upon custodial confessional interrogation is achieved,
there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be
eradicated in the forseeable future."6 The Court adopted the Wicker-
sham Commission's conclusion that "it is not sufficient to do justice by
obtaining a proper result by irregular or improper means."67
To this point in the opinion, the Court's analysis is subject to
minimal controversy. The Court initially looked to patent police mis-
conduct, similar to the type found in Brown,6" a type of behavior
clearly violative of the plain meaning of the fifth amendment and
our jurisprudential conception of fairness.
The Court then addressed itself to the problem of psychological
coercion, stating that it "has recognized that coercion can be mental
as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only
hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition."69 Noting that inter-
rogation invariably occurs in private, the Court concluded that this
procedure affords the interrogator a psychological advantage.70 This
conclusion was prompted, at least in part, by the Justices' examination
of police manuals wherein the technique of isolating the suspect for
questioning was heavily emphasized.
Considerable importance was placed on these police manuals as
evidence that police were making concerted efforts to "dupe" suspected
criminals into confessing. This general procedure, as outlined by the
Court, is as follows:
[T]o highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings, the man-
uals instruct the police to display an air of confidence in the
631d. at 445.
64 id. at 446.
65 205 N.E.2d 857, 257 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1965).
66 8384 U.S. at 447.
67 Id.
68 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
69 384 U.S. at 448, citing Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
70 Id. at 449-50.
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suspect's guilt and from outward appearance to maintain only an
interest in confirming certain details. The guilt of the subject is
to be posited as a fact. The interrogator should direct his com-
ments toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather
than court failure by asking the subject whether be did it. Like
other men, perhaps the subject has had a bad family life, had an
unhappy childhood, had too much to drink, had an unrequited
desire for women. The officers are instructed to minimize the moral
seriousness of the offense, to cast blame on the victim or on society.
These tactics are designed to put the subject in a psychological
state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police
purport to know already-that he is guilty. Explanations to the con-
trary are dismissed and discouraged. 71
In the event this approach fails to produce a confession, other
techniques, as the Court noted, are suggested by the manuals. One
of the better known methods is the "Mutt and Jeff" routine, where
one of the officers appears to be tough, vengeful and threatening
while his partner is easy-going, apparently sincere and helpful. The
implication, bordering on an actual threat of force, is that the suspect
is in a better position by talking with the friendly policeman rather
than with the "tough guy," who is not in the room at this point.72
Another suggested technique designed to induce confessions is a
falsified lineup. In this procedure a fictitious witness identifies the
suspect, who then is asked to confess to make it easier for himself,
since he will now almost assuredly be convicted.73 If none of the
suggested techniques is fruitful and the suspect continues to assert his
fifth amendment right to silence, a final technique is suggested. The
officer is instructed to emphasize that suspicious actions, left unex-
plained, imply guilt.74 If the suspect requests a lawyer, the manuals
suggest that the police tell him that if he has nothing to hide, it is
useless to bother with the expense and trouble of obtaining a lawyer
when a few answers will clear up the matter.75
The Supreme Court may well be correct in its determination that
these techniques are clearly coercive. On the other hand, it could be
argued that these techniques are not as coercive as they outwardly
appear, since the suspect may have a real compulsion to confess.
Therefore, these techniques might be viewed as merely testing a
suspect's actual will to resist confession. Furthermore, even if the
Court's analysis is correct, it is questionable if the Court's remedies
7 lId. at 450 (footnotes omitted).
72 Id. at 452.
73 Id. at 453.
74 Id. at 454.
75 Id.
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provide a realistic tool for preventing such police abuses. Hastily
reading to the suspect a statement of his constitutional rights is not
likely to minimize the coercive impact of a police station itself and
the legitimate police procedures that precede and follow the suspect's
arrival there.
The Court nevertheless pointed to specific situations to buttress its
contention that without adequate warnings a defendant is unfairly
coerced. Among the cases thus cited were Townsend v. Sein,76 wherein
a 19-year old heroin addict and near mental defective was coerced
into confessing, and Lynumn v. Illinois,77 in which a woman con-
fessed after being "importunated [sic] to cooperate in order to
prevent her children from being taken away."78 It should be noted,
however, that these situations easily could be dealt with under the
tests propounded prior to Miranda; the latter, for example, is clearly
violative of due process.
After reciting certain facts relevant to the Miranda cases the Court
concluded:
[I]n these cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to
have been involuntary in traditional terms. Our concern for ade-
quate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment rights is,
of course, not lessened in the slightest.79
The importance of this statement is readily apparent-the Court
implicitly is saying that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is not merely a right that an individual may assert, but
rather is one which the government must ensure that the defendant
is cognizant of and waives actively, affirmatively, and with knowledge
of the consequences, if at all. This view appears to be a long step
from the original and popular notion that the right was created to
protect the innocent from abusive procedures. It is submitted that
the Founders conceptualized the right against self-incrimination to
be applicable in Brown-type cases rather than as a veil for actual,
admitted wrongdoers. The Court conceded this point, but asserted
that in order to protect innocent persons from police abuses in the
relatively few cases in which they come under suspicion, procedural
safeguards must be employed in every case.
The Court enunciated a second policy behind its decision by
stating that "our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that
the government seeking to punish an individual produce evidence by
76 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
77 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
78 384 U.S. at 457, citing Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
79 384 U.S. at 457.
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its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient
of compelling it from [the suspect's] own mouth."80 This assertion,
though apparently sound at first blush, may be a bit naive in view
of many modern criminal practices. For example, often the only way
to convict a mugger is by confession, since there rarely are witnesses
to his criminal acts.
The Court, furthermore, made it very clear that the procedures
set forth in Miranda must be followed, not just in police stations and
courts of law, but rather "in all settings in which [a person's] freedom
of action is curtailed in any significant way.""' It is noted that "in-
custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely."8 2 It is obvious that the Court
departed from the subjective "voluntariness" test and established as a
basic constitutional doctrine the premise that without the Miranda
warnings, a suspect is not capable of voluntarily waiving his fifth
amendment rights. Even though the Court argued that Miranda is
not a "constitutional straight jacket"83 and stated that it will consider
other procedures that "are at least as effective"84 as those outlined in
Miranda, the decision appears to be an unwarranted stretching of
constitutional doctrine. For example, it apparently assumes that
without police warning, even a professor of criminal law is not
sufficiently apprised of his rights.
In outlining the specific safeguards, the Court stated that the
police must "show the individual that his interrogators are prepared
to recognize his privilege."8 5 This requirement is unrealistic because
if the basic problem is control of police behavior, it is unreasonable
to assume that even if the police do give the warnings, they will
exhibit any effort to make the suspect feel at ease. Indeed, such an
attitude is simply alien to the role society asks the police to play. It
is equally unrealistic to assume that a Miranda warning will min-
mize the coercive atmosphere, since the notification requirement can
be satisfied (and probably often is) by a mere mechanical recitation
of the accused's rights.
The Court, in further explaining the new warnings, declared that
the right to counsel is not waived unless "specifically made after the
80 Id. at 460.
81384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 468.
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warnings"80 and cited with favor People v. Dorado,"7 suggesting that
a defendant who waives counsel is the one most in need of representa-
tion. Carrying this rationale to a logical extreme, one can likewise
argue that anyone who confesses is clearly in need of a lawyer,
because no rational man wants to make incriminating statements. This
approach is clearly contrary to the Court's earlier statements that a
confession voluntarily made and properly received is clearly admissible;
however, one could argue that proper warnings are needed to ensure
that the confession is truly voluntary. But as will be discussed later,
the problem is in defining "voluntary," because if a confession is an
irrational process, a rational system of warnings is an altogether in-
effective device.
Perhaps the strongest requirement established by the Miranda
Court is that the warning must include notice that if an indigent
desires an attorney, one will be provided for him at no cost. The
Court stated that, without assurances of court appointed counsel,
the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be
understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if
he has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right
to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would
convey to the indigent-the person most often subjected to inter-
rogation-the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel
present. As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and
of the general right to counsel, only by effective and express
explanation to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that
he was truly in a position to exercise it.88
If, after all these warnings have been given, the suspect still
confesses to a crime, Miranda imposes a "heavy burden" 9 on the
prosecution to prove that the suspect "voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently"90 waived his constitutional rights. Realistically, this
exercise is pointless, because if the waiver is in fact freely given,
there is no problem. On the other hand, if the waiver is improperly
obtained, there is no reason to assume that the same policemen who
used questionable tactics to obtain a confession will not use unethical
tactics to prove the voluntariness of the confession.
The Miranda decision, finally, was the result of a counter-balancing
of two fundamental and often conflicting societal interests: (1) the
protection of individual rights, and (2) the desire and the need to
so id. at 470.
87 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).
88 384 U.S. at 473 (footnotes omitted).
89 Id.
go Id. at 475.
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punish wrongdoers.91 The Court tipped the scale in favor of individual
rights of the accused on the premise that if the government becomes
a 'law breaker, it breeds contempt for the law, [and] . . . it invites
anarchy." 2 This last proposition propounded by the Court is not
disputed, but there may be alternative remedies to those chosen in
Miranda which can serve both society's interest in preserving indi-
vidual rights and its need to punish criminals.
III. RAMIICAoNs OF MMANA
In discussing the ramifications of Miranda, it is essential to analyze
the present policy regarding criminal procedure as it affects law,
psychology, literature, and the "mass reality".
A. Law
The best starting point for an analysis of the effects of Miranda
on the law is the dissenting opinion in that case of Mr. Justice Harlan,
who refused to subscribe to the majority view that abusive police
tactics were widespread. In a critical analysis of the new rules, he
stated:
I think [that] it must be frankly recognized at the outset that police
questioning allowable under due process precedents may in-
herently entail some pressure on the suspect and may seek ad-
vantage in his ignorance or weaknesses. The atmosphere and
questioning techniques, proper and fair though they be, can in
themselves exert a tug on the suspect to confess, and in this light
"to speak of any confessions or crime made after arrest as being
'voluntary' or 'uncoerced' is somewhat inaccurate, although tradi-
tional. A confession is wholly and incontestably voluntary only if
a guilty person gives himself up to the law and becomes his own
accuser." . . . Until today, the role of the Constitution has been
only to sift out undue pressure, not to assure spontaneous con-
fessions.
The Court's new rules aim to offset these minor pressures and
disadvantages intrinsic to any kind of police interrogation. The
rules do not serve due process interests in preventing blatant
coercion since, as I noted earlier, they do nothing to contain the
policeman who is prepared to lie from the start. The rules work
for reliability in confessions almost only in the Pickwickian sense
that they can prevent some from being given at all. In short, the
benefit of this new regime is simply to lessen or wipe out the
inherent compulsion and inequalities to which the Court devotes
some nine pages of description.93
91 Id. at 479.
92 Id. at 480, citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
93 384 U.S. 436, 515-6 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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In part, Justice Harlan is suggesting that the majority chose a
remedy that is neither realistic nor viable. This conclusion is war-
ranted by several major studies, perhaps the best being one con-
ducted by the Yale Law School.94 This study, run over an eleven
week period on an around-the-clock basis in the summer of 1966, was
undertaken "to evaluate the claims that interrogations are inherently
coercive and that Miranda will substantially impede successful law
enforcement."95 As might be expected, the study revealed that the
more serious the crime in question, the more rigorous the interrogation.
Likewise, it showed that the more serious the crime, the more likely
it is that the defendant will realize the advantage of asserting his
constitutional rights. For example, a potential defendant arrested for
vandalism at age 16 is justified in believing that if he cooperates he
may be treated leniently, whereas it is hardly reasonable for a murder
suspect to believe that cooperation will result in leniency.
The Yale study did substantiate the Supreme Court's assertion that
the tactics illustrated in police manuals were in fact utilized; however,
those tactics were found to be employed in a haphazard manner.9
As a result, fears of a hardened professional interrogator facing a
helpless criminal are largely baseless. In fact; in a number of situations,
the suspect may be an experienced "conman" who is, in fact, in a
superior position to that of the interrogator. Moreover, the feared
techniques are not very sophisticated. The "Mutt and Jeff" routine,
for example, is just a version of a familiar parental technique by
which a child is disciplined by the threat of punishment when his
father returns home.
This is not to suggest that abuses never occur. Three of more than
100 suspects involved in the Yale study were told that there would be
trouble for their families if they failed to cooperate. This type of
abuse, however, could have been dealt with by pre-Miranda due
process decisions.97  It should be noted that, although the study
produced no evidence of physical abuse,98 this was probably to a
great extent due to the presence of the Yale student in the inter-
rogation room.
The incidence of strict compliance with the Miranda warnings
was very low-only 25 out of 118 suspects received the warnings as
94Note Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YA.E L.J.
1519 (19675 [hereinafter cited as Interrogation in New Haven].
95 Id. at 1522.
96 Id. at 1543.
97 E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).98 Interrogation in New Haven, supra note 94, at 1549.
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set forth in the decision.91 The reason given for such non-compliance
was that the police were unfamiliar with the new rules; the same
excuse would have little credibility today.
In addition, the study indicated that a number of suspects were
at first unsuccessful in terminating the interrogation by asserting their
Miranda rights. It was only when they became adamant that the
police ceased the interrogation. Even where the suspect did remain
silent, the benefit was not as great as one might expect, since the
study suggested that in only one of seven cases where the suspect
remained silent would a plea of not guilty have had a sound basis.
"Since most suspects probably will eventually plead guilty whether
or not they confess at the police station, Mirandds effect may be
simply to postpone confession from interrogation to the plea-bargain-
ing stage." 10 0 One factor mentioned in this regard was that the
stronger the prosecutions case, the more likely it was that a con-
fession would result.1' 1
It is suggested that the circumstances surrounding the crime may
be more useful in determining the voluntariness of a confession than
are the procedures and criteria established in Miranda. For example,
if a criminal assault occurs in a crowded bus terminal, in full view of
witnesses, it is reasonable to assume that the ordinary suspect would
voluntarily confess, whereas a professional like Joey would be unlikely
to confess. Of course, this is an extreme illustration, but the point is
that the circumstances relating to the crime and the criminal are
more indicative of the likelihood of a voluntary confession than the
mere application of (or failure to apply) procedural safeguards.
The study, further, supports the observation, supra, that Miranda
warnings can do little to minimize the "inherently coercive atmosphere"
of a police station.10 2 The crux of the study's findings in this regard
was expressed in the following language:
The suspect arrested and brought downtown for questioning
is in a crisis laden situation. The stakes for him are high-often his
freedom for a few or many years-and his prospects hinge on
decisions that must be quickly made: to cooperate and hope for
leniency, to try and talk his way out, to stand adamantly on his
rights. Unless he is a professional, the suspect is unlikely to know
the movements of the law enforcement machinery. The likely con-
sequences of the alternatives open to him are unclear-how much
leniency cooperation may earn, how likely fast talk is to succeed,
9 Id. at 1550.100 Id. at 1607.
101 Id. at 1608-09.
102 Id. at 1613.
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how much a steadfast refusal to talk may contribute to a decision
by the police, prosecutor or judge to 'throw the book' at him.10 3
Given this situation, the study hypothesizes, the suspect's prior
knowledge of his rights may be of much greater importance than
Miranda. This suggests that a more reasonable (though admittedly
idealistic) approach to inform potential defendants of their rights is
in a forum before they are apprehended (e.g., in public schools).
The conclusion of the study is striking. "Our data and impressions
in New Haven converge to a single conclusion: Not much has changed
after Miranda. Despite the dark predictions by the critics of the
decision, the impact on law enforcement has been small."10 4 Two
reasons are suggested for this lack of impact. First, confessions play
only a secondary role in solving crimes, at least in New Haven and
in towns of similar size. Second, even when utilized, the Miranda
warnings seem to have only a minimal effect on the frequency of
confessions. 05
B. Mass Reality
The impact of Miranda surely has not been confined solely to the
area of law; the ramifications of this decision extend far afield.
Courts cannot operate in isolation but rather must respect and reflect
the common will. The law cannot disregard the public will without
running the risk that the public will disregard the law. To measure
the full effect of Miranda, then, it is necessary to examine what
may be termed the "mass reality" (i.e., the public mood), 10 6 the field
of psychology, and literature.
As a preface to a consideration of the first of these areas, it is sug-
gested that empirical studies may be of little importance in that the
"mass reality" or public mood is not merely a function of values but
is a conglomorate of emotions, values and impressions. It is founded
upon common sense rather than logic.' 07 To the man on the street,
Miranda, Escobedo, Jackson, and the other landmark criminal rights
decisions are not cases of great legal and constitutional significance,
103 Id. at 1613-14.
104 Id. at 1613.
105 A similar study affirmed the conclusions reached by the Yale study and
found that although there was a minor decrease in the rate of confessions,
Miranda had had no major impact on police behavior. Seeburger & Wetlick,
Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. Prrr. L. Rzv. 1 (1967).
106'Mass reality" denotes a common sense impression of the contemporary
American scene.
107 At this point, it is only fair to note that I am making two assumptions
which I cannot prove. First, any legal system will fail without public support and
respect. Second, an evaluation of the public mood must be impressionistic and
not empirical.
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but rather represent a series of tools and legal technicalities which
enable skillful lawyers to thwart the course of justice. In his eyes
it is justice to the highest bidder. Money will buy a "mouthpiece"
who can twist and turn the law to release the guilty, but wealthy de-
fendants. Perhaps, too, a few lucky indigents will be chosen by liberal
professors as test cases.
It is difficult for the law abiding citizen to comprehend how a
man like Joey can, for all practical purposes, confess to 38 murders and
walk the streets with apparent immunity from prosecution. It is even
more difficult, if not impossible, for him to condone such a situation
or to respect the law that has created it. Freedom for a confessed
rapist like Miranda or murderers like Jackson and Escobedo is almost
unfathomable. To the laymen, confessions represent a routine facet
of our system of criminal justice; they are not "beaten" out of people,
but if a little force is used, it is for the public benefit anyway. His
experience with confessions came from watching Perry Mason, who,
invariably defends a "framed" party and secures a spontaneous con-
fession from the real culprit by confronting him with the facts. As a
result, this, rather than what actually happens in the back room of a
New York police station, represents reality for him.
Additionally, to many Americans, confessions are not only normal
and prevalent but are also simply the right thing to do. How many
Americans have not been educated in a school where an appro-
priately matronly teacher has not lectured on the benefits of "fessing
up" to one's misdeeds? Miranda and similar cases openly affront these
traditional American values. Jack Webb always devotes a significant
amount of time to demeaning the virtues of procedural due process.
Naturally, Jack does not abuse his suspects, make deals, take gratuities
or the like. This is the image many middle class Americans have of
their police.
It is not suggested that the Supreme Court should modulate its
interpretation of the Constitution based on public sentiment. How-
ever, when fashioning a remedy the Court must take this factor
into account. To many Americans, the value of "fessing up" is of
higher priority, along with reducing street crime, than protecting the
rights secured by the fifth amendment. Analogously, the recent
public mood about the Watergate tapes suggests that the public is
far more concerned with hearing the tapes than with the doctrine of
executive privilege. In short, the public is concerned with results.
Foremost among its objectives is getting the criminal behind bars;
assuring procedural due process is very likely far down the list.
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C. Psychology
As unsophisticated as the lay approach to confessions may be, it is
not without support from the field of psychology. At this point, it is
only fair to note that the thrust of the following psychological analysis
is Freudian. The author realizes that there are many who feel that
Freud is now discredited. However, the reader is reminded that this
note is intended to be provocative rather than conclusionary, a
purpose which the controversial analytical approach employed here-
inafter serves well.
As a basic proposition, Freud contends that man's mental processes
are divided into an id, ego and superego. The ego represents the
conscious state as it is generally perceived in everyday experience.
The id represents the unconscious processes and is more primitive
and impulsive than the other two. It symbolizes our base desires.
The superego represents another aspect of the conscious which can
be conceptualized as the right/wrong mechanism-in short, our con-
science. It is the battle between the id and the superego that results
in a confession.
The basic Freudian conception was utilized by Theodor Reik in his
work The Compulsion to Confess.108 The title is suggestive of the
author's basic thesis-that when a person is confronted with an act
contrary to what is known to be right, at least by the superego, the
conflict between the id and the superego compels a confession. For
example, a young man is vacationing in a resort hotel, where he meets
an attractive girl at a social encounter on a particular evening. He
obviously has certain sexual designs (i.e., id desires) which are
thwarted. The following morning at brealfast he sees the girl and
says:
Good morningl I thought of you still in bed. He meant to say, of
course, I thought you were still in bed. He became quite embar-
rased because of this silly slip. For us there can be no doubt that
this slip of the tongue is tantamount to a confession which might
be put into these words: How I longed for you still in bed. It is,
therefore, the confession of his tender and sensual wishes that
forced itself past his lips, into the middle of a conventional
sentence. Their expression would have been impossible otherwise
for reasons of propriety. It is clear that here the suppressed, as in a
Putsch, put itself impetuously in the place of the suppressing
powers, and, almost undistorted, made the break-through. 09
Reik suggests that this "confession" is due to the repression of the
108 T. PB=r, THE CouMPuLsioN TO CoNrxss (1945) [hereinafter cited as RxI.
109 Id. at 188.
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id drives, which are thereby forced to the surface by the compulsion
to confess, in order to relieve the conflict between the id and the
superego." i0 He theorizes that the process of confession is, therefore,
not the result of external pressures but rather is a function of internal
forces which are essentially irrational and unconscious. He further
contends that the confession is a modified urge for the expression
of the id drives and, because of the superego forces, that it is also in
part the product of a desire for punishment for the urges or actions.
Both of these are forced to the ego or conscious level-hardly a
rational process. The confession, then, serves the dual purpose of
satisfying the superego's feelings of guilt and need for punishment
and of allowing the id's "forbidden wishes [to] find a partial satis-
faction. . ... il
The above analysis can best be illustrated by placing it in the
context of Jackson v. Denno.1 2 There, Jackson told the police that
"I shot the colored cop-I got the drop on him.""13 This confession
can be seen as modified drives, which can be viewed as either an
archetypical killing of a father figure or repressed aggression. In
either event Jackson's confession served to relieve the conflict between
id and superego and at the same time, as Reik suggests, served as a
partial satisfaction in the verbal reenactment of the drive/crime.114
The obvious question is: "Why should a man like Jackson con-
fess?' It was not a rational decision. Later, he balked at telling
the confession in toto. Why then did he confess? Could it be that
the confession served to satisfy his need for punishment for having
committed a serious, if not archetypical crime? One could argue that
Jackson's confession was in fact an attempted resolution of the
Oedipal conflict. If one views the act of killing a policeman as the
destruction of the father-figure (the central desire in the Oedipal
conflict), then the confession, viewed as an articulated realization
that one cannot kill the father to have the mother, served as a
resolution of that Oedipal conflict.
To summarize, confession serves several important functions. It
relieves guilt and anxiety, satisfies the need for punishment, and helps
to resolve the Oedipal conflict. All of these processes are irrational,
operating on an unconscious level. Confessions therefore cannot be
dealt with by rational legal tests. When the law invalidates a con-
fession through procedural devices this serves to disrupt the psycho-
110 Id. at 190.
111 Id. at 201.112 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
1Id. at 371.
1i4 Bvx, supra note 108, at 203.
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logical equilibrium for the criminal and society. First, it creates
psychic confusion. The superego compels the criminal to confess,
but then the law, which is the societal counterpart of the superego,
releases a suspect due to violations of Miranda. The criminal is
frustrated psychologically; he confesses, expects punishment but
instead he is released. He may then commit another act in his
search for punishment. Second, society is confused as well. Its mem-
bers observe the criminal actuate certain urges which they too may
possess but have suppressed for fear of punishment. These same
individuals see the criminal who has so acted go free. The system
does not mesh with their emotional reality, especially when serious
crimes, such as rape and murder, are involved. If the ordinary
citizen's superego, which is in part the product of social mores,
becomes thereby programmed so as not to prevent such actions, the
repressed drives of an entire society may burst forth onto the streets.
Of course, this is melodramatic, but in a sense it explains the public
outrage at Miranda and its progeny.
The above Freudian analysis may be, at least in part, open to
serious challenge. However, it is submitted that if there is any
substance at all to the psycho-analytic approach to confessions, then
Miranda has created an intolerable situation. The very system which
is supposed to enforce the collective social conscience acts, in terms
of results, in a manner directly opposite to the values espoused. Con-
sequently, forbidden desires, effectuated in equally forbidden acts,
are not punished and wreck havoc with psychological balances in
individuals.
The psychological processes that produce confessions are uncon-
scious and irrational. The law, however, is logical and presumes the
confession process to be logical. Courts impose voluntariness as a
standard, safeguarded by a logical system of procedural rights with
a logical remedy for police misdeeds. Such a patterned approach
simply is not workable, because an irrational process is at the very
core of the problem; and, since these psychological processes cannot
change, the law must give way to resolve the contradictions." 5
115 If the reader finds this Freudian analysis a "bit much", consider a
non-Freudian hypothetical couched in layman's terms. Assume that a teenage
boy steals a sixpack of beer from his father, leaves the house and consumes the
beer with a friend. Upon returning home, the boy is visibly drunk. It would
not be unreasonable to assume that when confronted by his parents he might
confess. Such confessions would serve to relieve a certain anxiety he had about
getting caught. In addition, it would partially re-satisfy the id drives in that it
also serves as a partial re-enactment of the act-the boy is not only confessing
but also "bragging" about his adult exploits. Reik notes this fact by pointing
out that it is often not the punishment one fears as much as the anticipation of
the punishment.
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D. Literature
By observing confessions from a literary standpoint, one may gain
valuable insight into how non-legal intellectuals approach the problem.
Fyodor Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment1 6 is probably the classic
work on this subject. The chief protaganist, Raskolnikov, a would-be
intellectual scholar floundering in Petersburg in the late 19th century,
considers himself above the law as defined by mortal men. The
following excerpt is illustrative:
I simply hinted that an extraordinary man has the right, that is not
an official right, but an inner right to decide in his own conscience
to overstep ... certain obstacles, and only in case it is essential for
the practical fulfillment of his idea (sometimes, perhaps, of benefit
to the whole of humanity) . . . I maintain in my article that all
... well, legislators and leaders of men, such as Lycurgus, Solon,
Mahomet, Napoleon, and so on, were all without exception
criminals, from the very fact that, making a new law, they trans-
gressed the ancient one, handed down from their ancestors and
held sacred by the people, and they did not stop short at blood-
shed either, if that bloodshed-often of innocent persons fighting
bravely in defence of ancient law-were of use to their cause. It's
remarkable, in fact, that the majority, indeed, of these benefactors
and leaders of humanity were guilty of terrible carnage. In short,
I maintain that all great men or even men a little out of the com-
mon, that is to say capable of giving some new word, must from
their very nature be criminals-more or less, of course. Otherwise
it's hard for them to get out of the common rut; and to remain in
the common rut is what they can't submit to, for their very
nature again, and to my mind they ought not, indeed, to submit
to it. You see that there is nothing particularly new in all that.
The same thing has been printed and read a thousand times before.
As for my division of people into ordinary and extraordinary, I
acknowledge that it's somewhat arbitrary, but I don't insist upon
exact numbers. I only believe in my leading that men are in
general divided by a law of nature into two categories, inferior
(ordinary), that is, so to say, material that serves only to repro-
duce its kind, and men who have the gift or the talent to utter a
new word. There are, of course, innumerable sub-divisions, but
the distinguishing features of both categories are fairly well
marked.117
In pursuance of his right as a superior man, Raskolnikov decides
to commit the perfect crime by killing an old woman pawnbroker
whom he considers a menace to society. This pawnbroker has a
sister, and the plan calls for the murder to occur when the sister is
11OF. DOSTOEVSKY, CraME AND PuNsumm (C. Garnett transl. 1956).
117 Id. at 234-35.
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gone. However, as fate would have it, the sister enters the apartment
during the crime and Raskolnikov is forced to kill her as well.
Through his writings Raskolnikov becomes acquainted with the
investigating officer, Porfiry Petrovitch. Porfiry retains Raskolnikov
as an expert and assistant in solving the crime. Raskolnikov is clearly
a suspect in the Miranda sense, at least in the mind of Porfiry.
Illustrative is the following passage wherein Porfiry explains to
Raskolnikov his theory of how he will apprehend the criminal:
I leave one man quite alone, if I don't touch him and don't worry
him, but let him know or at least suspect every moment that I know
all about it and am watching him day and night, and if he is in
continual suspicion and terror, he'll be bound to lose his head.
He'll come of himself, or maybe do something which will make it
as plain as twice two are four-it's delightful. It may be so with a
simple peasant, but with one of our sort, an intelligent man cul-
tivated on a certain side, it's a dead certainty. For, my dear fellow,
it's a very important matter to know on what side a man is culti-
vated. And then there are nerves, there are nerves, you have over-
looked theml Why, they are all sick, nervous and terriblel
... And then how they all suffer from spleen! That I assure you
is a regular gold mine for us. And it's no anxiety to me, his run-
ning about the town free! Let him, let him walk about for a bit
I know well enough that I've caught him and that he won't escape
me. Where could he escape to, he-he? Abroad, perhaps? A Pole
will escape abroad, but not here, especially as I am watching and
have taken measures. Will he escape into the depths of the country
perhaps? But you know, peasants live there, real rude Russian
peasants. A modem cultivated man would prefer prison to living
with such strangers as our peasants. He-he! But that's all non-
sense and on the surface. It's not merely that he has nowhere to
run to, he is psychologically unable to escape me, he-he!" 8
During the course of the investigation, Raskolnikov is also involved
with a prostitute named Sonia, to whom he eventually makes his first
confession as follows:
"You can't guess, then?" he asked suddenly, feeling as though he
were flinging himself down from a steeple.
"N-no.. ." whispered Sonia.
"Take a good look."
As soon as he has said this again, the same familiar sensation
froze his heart. He looked at her and all at once seemed to see
in her face the face of Lizaveta [the pawnbroker's sister]. He
remembered clearly the expression in Lizaveta's face, when he
approached her with the axe and she stepped back to the wall,
putting out her hand, with childish terror in her face, looking as
118 Id. at 306-07.
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little children do when they begin to be frightened of something,
looking intently and uneasily at what frightens them, shrinking
back and holding out their little hands on the point of crying.
Almost the same thing happened now to Sonia. With the same
helplessness and the same terror, she looked at him for a while and,
suddenly putting out her left hand, pressed her fingers faintly
against his breast and slowly began to get up from the bed,
moving further from his and keeping her eyes fixed even more
immovably on him. Her terror infected him. The same fear showed
itself on his face. In the same way he stared at her and almost
with the same childish smile."19
This passage well illustrates the compulsion outlined in Rleik. Rlaskolni-
kov, of course, ultimately confesses to the police.
From Ciime and Punishment we can clearly discern a pattern
similar to that found in Reil's Compulsion to Confess. This similarity
manifests itself in a compulsion to confess to crimes that one believes
to be wrong-when the id and superego collide. Cime and Punish-
ment is, of course, only a novel and not valid legal authority. However,
one must not dismiss such literature as "Mere fiction". Dostoyevsky
seems to have touched up on some basic human behavior patterns
one of which is that when one does an act clearly beyond the social
mores, confession acts as a catharsis, as it did for Raskolnikov. Yet it
is not a rational process. It is an unconscious operation to relieve the
conflict between the id and superego forces.
There are surely many who will question the relevancy of the
literary approach. Perhaps some of this skepticism can be overcome
by approaching a modern-day hypothetical in common sense terms.
The never ending confessions seen on Perry Mason are certainly
within the pale of reason. Moreover, Jackson's blurting out "I shot
the colored cop-I got the drop on him"-20 is not farfetched. Both
of those fit into our system of reason and plausible reality. However,
what if a college student is stopped by the police and questioned
about drug use? It is unreasonable to expect him to blurt out, "I
confess, I confess, I've used illicit drugs. Save me from the killer
weed marijuana." It's simply ludicrous. Why? Because there is no
realistic conflict between id and superego. However, if caught "red-
handed" with the drugs, the suspect might make a rational choice to
bargain for leniency. All this points to the conclusion that, save
physical abuse or extreme mental disorder, all confessions are either
rational choices to bargain for leniency or compelled confessions
which are voluntary in a psychological but not a legal sense. "Vol-
119 Id. at 369.
120 378 U.S. at 371.
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untary", of course, is not the proper term, because a compelled con-
fession is not equivalent to a voluntary one. This is due to the afore-
mentioned conflict between rational legal systems and irrational
psychological behavior.
Compulsion,'21 by Meyer Levin, affords an opportunity to view
confessions from a perspective that is at once fictional and factual.
This largely fictional work is based on the story of Leopold and Loeb
(Strauss and Steiner in the novel), the famous kidnappers of the
1920's who were defended by Clarence Darrow. In the novel the two
teenagers are represented as twentieth-century Raskolnikovs who, like
Dostoyevsky's character, have a feeling of moral superiority in terms
of the law. For "kicks", they plot the "crime of the century". The
plan is an intricate kidnapping in which they abduct a friend of
one of their brothers. The money is to be thrown off a moving train,
timed so as to minimize the risk of being caught. The victim is killed,
and the plot fails for three reasons. First, the body, improperly buried,
is found prior to the delivery of the ransom. Second, one of the kid-
nappers leaves his glasses at the scene. The frames, a rare make, are
easily traceable to the suspects but not to the point of giving the
police an airtight case. Third, the typewriter used for the ransom
note is not destroyed.
Although the police developed a fairly solid case by physical
evidence, it is bolstered considerably by a confession obtained when
the boys are "tricked" by the ancient technique of playing one off
against the other. Steiner, confronted with an alleged confession by
Strauss, divulges the whole story.122 It is quite probable that, in
reality, Strauss and Steiner wanted to be caught. Why else would
extremely intelligent persons neglect such obvious details as the glasses,
the burial, and the typewriter. More importantly, why did they
confess, when they were clearly aware of the legal consequences?
Clearly Strauss, Steiner, and Raskolnikov may not be the type of
person Miranda was intended to protect, but it is equally clear that
it would. The confessions in all these cases were necessary for the
welfare of the individuals and society both legally and psychologically.
To void them on procedural grounds is foolish.
CONCLUSION
This note has outlined the basic substance of criminal procedure
as it relates to confessions and has explored the policies behind the
121 M. LEviN, COMPULSION (1956).
122 Id. at 252.
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law as espoused by the Supreme Court. Hopefully, it has revealed
the inevitable conflict that exists between the natural instinct to
confess and the Supreme Court's restrictions in this area of the law.
Confessions, compelled by an unconscious process, are necessary to
resolve deep psychological needs and are crucial to any proper
rehabilitation of criminals. Modem criminal procedural law, espe-
cially Miranda, interrupts this normal psychological process.
Confessions are viewed with favor by the police, society, writers
and psychologists. The law must find a procedure which both reflects
this attitude and provides a remedy for the constitutional violations
which may be involved. To accomplish this, Miranda must first be
circumvented. This need not be done by specifically arguing for
reversal in the Supreme Court, because the Court itself left open the
possibility of alternative remedies.
Second, the exclusionary approach should be used only in those
cases that could be decided on the basis of due process. 1 23 As discussed
above, the due process cases turn not on the violation of constitutional
rights but on the believability of the confessions in light of severe
police misconduct used to elicit them. The truthfulness question
should be determined by the procedures set forth in Lego 24 and
Jackson 25 coupled with the utilization of a reasonable doubt standard
and a mandatory provision for the jury to consider the issue of truth-
fulness if the judge rules against the defendant.
Third, realizing that traditional civil remedies are ineffective, I
propose the creation of an administrative agency based on the format
of the National Labor Relations Board, 20 which would be subject
to judicial review. In the event that a defendant alleged police mis-
conduct and lost on the issue of truthfulness (i.e., the court finds his
confession true but in violation of constitutional rights), he would
submit a claim to the agency. Clearly unwarranted and unfounded
claims would be dismissed. This would protect both the defendant
and avoid wasting police time defending frivolous claims. However,
if the claim were found to be valid, the agency would be empowered
to redress the grievance with remedies (e.g., damages, fines, suspen-
sions from duty or discharges). The damages awarded to any criminal
would be held in trust and subject to a lien in favor of the victims of
the crime in question.
123 E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
124 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
125 378 U.S. 368 (1964).126 For the format of the NLRB, see 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1970).
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Such a system, it is submitted, would be more apt than the
measures currently employed to prevent police misconduct. First, an
officer is much more likely to reform his conduct when faced with
the prospect of a fine than with the chance of a suspect being freed.
Second, the criminal would be afforded the psychological benefit of a
confession. Third, the public interest would be served in that ad-
mitted criminals would have a remedy for their wrongs but would
not be free. Finally, a measure of the respect for the law lost by
Miranda might be restored.
Such a system, if put into operation would certainly not cure all
of the present ills of the law of criminal procedure. Indeed, the above
stated proposals may be subject to many infirmities. At least, however,
they may serve as a much needed catalyst for solving the conflict
between Miranda and Reality.
Robert G. Lowen
